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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
Robinson v. Finkel'
(decided September 17, 2002)
Petitioner Tawana Robinson challenged an administrative
determination terminating her twenty-one year tenancy by
respondent, the New York City Housing Authority and its acting
chairman, Kalman Finkel, through an Article 782 proceeding
Robinson also sought a judgment declaring the New York City
Housing Authority's tenancy termination policies and practices
unlawful.4 Robinson argued the Housing Authority's termination
was "infected by errors of law, including denial of due process of
law, was arbitrary and capricious, rested on abuse of discretion and
was unsupported by substantial evidence."' The New York
Supreme Court granted Robinson's petition and annulled the
Housing Authority's determination to terminate Robinson's
tenancy after finding the Housing Authority penalized Robinson in
'748 N.Y.S.2d 448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2002).
2 Article 78 "creates a cause of action by which petitioners can challenge
decisions by state administrative agencies in the State Supreme Court, and
obtain '[r]elief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review, mandamus
or prohibition."' Morris v. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys., 129 F. Supp.
2d 599, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (2003)). See
also N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801, 7803, 7804 (McKinney 2003) (discussing Article
78 proceedings).
3 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
4 Id. at 454. The court subsequently determined that a declaratory judgment
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an unduly harsh and shockingly disproportionate manner.' The
court reasoned that while the Housing Authority's failure to follow
its own rules was sufficient to annul the determination terminating
Robinson's tenancy, its policy of replacing "the procedural
safeguards of a recorded hearing before an impartial hearing
officer... with form stipulations" violated Robinson's federal due
process rights.7
Respondent Housing Authority operates the public housing
project where Robinson is a tenant.' In August 1996, Robinson's
son, Donnel Robinson, an authorized occupant of the apartment,
was arrested on project grounds for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance.' In March 1997, Robinson was informed that
her failure to ensure Donnel's compliance with the Tenant Rules
and Regulations resulted in a tenancy termination
recommendation. 10 According to the Housing Authority, Donnel
violated the regulations and rules by "unlawfully possess[ing]
marijuana and/or possess[ing] a contro[l]led substance.""
6 1d. at 465.
7 Id. at 458-59; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 providing in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
8 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
9 Id. Robinson contended that the charges against Donnel had been dismissed
and the file sealed; the court adopted this fact as true since the respondents did
not offer any evidence to the contrary. Id.
10 Id. The Tenant Rules and Regulations require that individuals on the
property with the tenant's consent "conduct themselves in a manner conducive
to maintaining the project in a decent, safe and sanitary conditions [sic]. . . ." Id.
Robinson's other son, Shamel Robinson, was also named in the recommendation
for termination charges. However, the Housing Authority never sought his
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Robinson failed to appear at the first hearing in April 1997, and a
Hearing Officer issued a default decision and disposition against
her.12 Upon Robinson's request, she was granted a new hearing
and, at that time, received written notice and a copy of the Housing
Authority's Termination of Tenancy Procedures."
During the rescheduled August 1997 hearing, Robinson and
the Housing Authority's attorney, Carle, stipulated in writing that
the administrative proceeding would be resolved by Robinson
agreeing to permanent exclusion of her son, Donnel, from both
residing and visiting with Robinson on the project's premises.'
4
Additionally, paragraph four of the stipulation provided for
unannounced Housing Authority visits to Robinson's apartment to
check for compliance with the stipulation. 5  Furthermore,
paragraph nine stated, "the foregoing determination shall have the
12 Id.
'3 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 451. Pursuant to the Housing Authority's
tenancy termination procedures, project managers must "interview the tenant in
order to discuss the problem which may lead to termination of tenancy, seek to
ascertain the facts involved, and, when appropriate, seek to assist the tenant by
securing help." Additionally, if the project manager believed termination of the
tenancy was appropriate, he or she was to forward the entire file, along with
written recommendations, to a Tenancy Administrator for review and
appropriate action. In cases of terminated tenancy, files were forwarded to the
Legal Department for the preparation of a Notice of Charges. No project
manager ever interviewed Robinson. Id. at 457.
14 Id. at 451-52. The permanent exclusion of Robinson's son Donnel was
contained in paragraph three of the stipulation. Additionally, paragraph five of
the stipulation placed Robinson on general probation for one year and stated that
"ANY" violation of housing policies would, in effect, constitute a violation of
the stipulation, subjecting Robinson to "additional penalties, including
termination." Id. at 452.
" Id. at 452.
3
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same force and effect as a decision and disposition by the hearing
officer."' 6
In October 1997, during an unannounced visit by a Housing
Authority employee, Donnel was found in Robinson's apartment.
7
A subsequent April 1998 notice informed Robinson of the Housing
Authority's recommendation to terminate her tenancy due to
breach of the stipulation agreement and that the recommendation
could be contested at a hearing. 8 At the ensuing June 1998
hearing, Robinson admitted violating Donnel's stipulated
permanent exclusion from the apartment; she maintained, however,
that Donnel's October sleepover was the sole violation of the
stipulation and was done for a medical purpose. 9 Robinson also
produced an affidavit from her cousin averring that Donnel resided
in the cousin's Bronx home, and she further testified that Donnel
began living there three months prior to her signing the
stipulation.0 The Hearing Officer found that Robinson violated
the permanent exclusion term in the stipulation and the Housing
Authority adopted this disposition of termination on July 29, 1998;
Robinson claimed that no notice of this action was given.2'
Approximately five months later, the Housing Manager told
Robinson that her entire file was being reviewed, but Robinson
16id.
17 Id. at 453.
"8 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
'9 Id. Robinson testified that Donnel had an appointment at a hospital across
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would have an opportunity to appear at a hearing with her attorney
before a final termination decision was reached. 2   However,
instead of giving her notice of a hearing, the Housing Authority's
subsequent correspondence advised Robinson that her tenancy was
terminated and that she had a month to vacate the apartment.23
In her petition, Robinson alleged, inter alia, that the
termination of tenancy was based on an unenforceable
stipulation.24 In particular, Robinson claimed that the Housing
Authority's practice of using form stipulations signed by
unrepresented tenants under the guidance of a Housing Authority
attorney removed the "procedural safeguards of a recorded hearing
before an impartial hearing officer. -25 Such tenancy termination
procedures therefore failed to provide due process of law and were
"contrary to the consent decrees from which they derive[d]."26
The court held that the stipulation could not effect an
informed, knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutionally
protected rights because the stipulation:
was not made on the record, was not independently
reviewed by a Hearing officer, . . . Petitioner lacked
legal representation, . . . the role of the Housing
Authority attorney was partisan, per se, . . . the
stipulation itself did not clearly show waiver, and
22 id.
23 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
24 Id.
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•.. the bargaining power between Robinson and the
Housing Authority was unequal.27
Initially, the court recognized that two federal
constitutional law decisions controlled whether the Housing
Authority's stipulation practice accorded public housing tenants
due process in tenancy terminations.28 The first case, Escalera v.
New York City Housing Authority,29 is a class action brought by
public housing tenants alleging, among other things, deprivation of
the tenants' rights to due process secured by the United States
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment? More specifically, the
tenants challenged the constitutionality of the procedures used by
the Housing Authority to terminate tenancies based on
nondesirability" and for procedures used when the basis of
271 Id. at 464.
2 8 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
29425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
30 Id. at 856.
31 Id. at 857. The procedures for termination of tenancy due to nondesirability
consisted of: a meeting between the project manager and the tenant where the
tenant was informed that the manager was considering a recommendation to
terminate tenancy and the tenant was given a chance to explain the undesirable
conduct; once the project manager decided that recommendation of termination
was appropriate, the tenant was notified that he or she could submit a statement
along with the manger's recommendation, and the tenant's entire file was sent to
the Tenant Review Board; if the Board made a preliminary determination that
tenancy should be terminated, the tenant had to request an appearance in ten
days at which time the tenant would be informed, usually by a one sentence
statement, of the undesirable conduct at issue and that he or she could bring any
person to assist him or her at the meeting. During the hearing, the tenant was
not generally permitted to see the entire contents of the folder, the names of
those complaining about his conduct, or the summary of the entries; however,
the basis for termination for nondesirability was premised on the contents of the
entire folder, even if the tenant had no knowledge of the entries. No transcript
of the hearing was maintained. If the Board determined that the tenant was no
longer eligible for public housing, the Board Chairman so notified the tenant
without releasing any findings or reasons therefore. If the tenant failed to vacate
6
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termination was a violation of Housing Authority rules and
regulations.32 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the
district court's grant of the Housing Authority's motion to dismiss,
held that "the government cannot deprive a private citizen of his
continued tenancy, without affording him adequate procedural
safeguards ... ."" The court reasoned the Housing Authority's
tenant termination for nondesirability procedures failed to give
tenants adequate notice of the evidence against them, failed to
provide an evidentiary record on which the decision was based and
failed to give tenants a chance to confront and cross-examine
persons giving evidence against them before an impartial hearing
officer.34
As to the termination procedures for rule and regulation
violations, the court found those procedures suffered deficiencies
the apartment after a month, tenants could contest the decision in the New York
City Civil Court, but only on the issue of whether the notice to vacate was
timely. Id. at 857-58. The Housing Authority's Tenant Review Handbook
deemed families non-desirable if they represented:
a detriment to health, safety, morals or its neighbors or the
community; an adverse influence upon sound family and
community life; a source of danger or a cause of damage to
the property of the Authority; a source of danger to the
peaceful occupation of other tenants, or a nuisance.
Id. at 857 n.1.
32 Id. at 859. The procedure for termination of tenancy for violation of rules
and regulations consisted of: the project manager holding a meeting with the
tenant to discuss the alleged violation; if the project manager determined that
termination was the appropriate course of action, the tenant's file, including the
tenant's comments and a recommendation to terminate, was sent to the Housing
Authority's Central Office; if the Central Office approved the manager's
decision to terminate, a notice to vacate after one month was sent to the tenant.
Id. at 861.
13 Id. at 861.
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similar to those for termination for nondesirability, and
additionally, due process required that a tenant be afforded the
right to present his or her side to an impartial official, not only to
the project manager. 5 Subsequently, after remand to the district
court, the "Escalera consent decree" was entered, "setting out the
basic procedures for notice and hearing required by the applicable
principles of due process of law in processing termination of
tenancy proceedings against all tenants in public housing projects
"36
The second "federal constitutional decision form[ing] the
backdrop for consideration of the issues raised by the Housing
Authority's stipulation practice"37 is Tyson v. New York City
Housing Authority." In consolidated actions, the plaintiffs in
Tyson disputed the constitutionality of the Housing Authority's
termination proceedings for nondesirability under a substantive
due process theory; the issue was whether the Housing Authority
could evict an entire family for nondesirability based on the
criminal acts of an adult child not residing with the family. 9 The
court's holding, that "implicit within the concept of due process is
that liability may be imposed on an individual only as a result of
that person's own acts or omissions . . . ,"" resulted in a consent
decree placing substantive limitations on the Housing Authority's
" Id. at 863.
36 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
37 Id.
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policies for termination for nondesirability.4' Subsequently, the
Randolph consent decree further developed Tyson's substantive
limitations and additionally required all termination of tenancy
procedures for nondesirability to conform with newly adopted
procedures.42
Thus, Housing Authority termination procedures are
required to have "qualified Hearing Officers... mak[ing] specific
written findings of fact on all issues raised at a termination hearing
... ,4 Moreover, such findings and determinations of a tenant's
eligibility status must be "based solely on evidence presented at the
hearing," and the evidence is to constitute the record."
Additionally, when the Housing Authority reviewed the Hearing
Officer's decision, the review was to be based upon the record, and
a Hearing Officer's decision was not to be overturned unless it was
contrary to law.45
However, neither of the consent decrees provided for the
use of stipulations to replace the hearing procedures for tenancy
terminations outlined in the Escalera and Tyson-Randolph
decrees.46 Rather, minimal due process requirements for tenancy
41 Robinson, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
42 Id. The Robinson court noted that there were two related consolidated
actions that produced two consent decrees. The Tyson decree addressed
substantive limitations of termination of tenancy for nondesirability, while the
second decree comprehended several consolidated class actions in which
Randolph was the lead plaintiff; the Randolph decree addressed procedural
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terminations for nondesirability necessitate that "the tenant have
adequate advance notice, an evidentiary hearing on the record,
with an opportunity to confront and cross-examine and otherwise
to be informed of the evidence, before an impartial hearing
officer."47  Therefore, by signing the stipulation as a means of
resolving the termination proceeding, Robinson waived her federal
due process right to a hearing before an impartial Hearing Officer;
instead, she dealt only with the Housing Authority's attorney."
Additionally, there was no record and no evidence that a Hearing
Officer ever approved the stipulation, and the Housing Authority
never bore the burden of proving that Donnel's conduct warranted
a proceeding terminating Robinson's tenancy in the first place.49
Furthermore, without a hearing, Robinson lost the opportunity to
show that she was no longer subject to termination because Donnel
had already moved out of the apartment before Robinson signed
the stipulation; there was no need for her to "bargain for a
disposition of permanent exclusion or probation."5
Yet, federal constitutional rights such as due process rights
to notice and a hearing before judgment are subject to waiver, and
whether a federal constitutional right has been waived is a federal
question controlled by federal law." Therefore, "the appropriate
standard for addressing whether stipulations . . . [in tenancy
termination cases] should be given binding effect is that provided
41 Id. at 459.
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by federal law, rather than that applicable to contracts generally.
5 2
In D.H. Overmeyer Co. Inc. v. Frick Co.,53 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a cognovit provision in a contract between
corporate parties with equal bargaining power as constitutional
where the party against whom the provision was enforceable
"voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived the rights it
otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and hearing, and that it
did so with full awareness of the legal consequences."54 On the
other hand, contractual waivers of due process rights are
unconstitutional under Fuentes v. Shevin" when there is unequal
bargaining power between the parties or when the party against
52 Id. But see Romero v. Martinez, 721 N.Y.S.2d 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't
2001) aff'd, 759 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 2001). The court applied the judicial
standard of review for administrative decisions, i.e., whether substantial
evidence supported the agency's findings, and upheld a terminated tenancy for
violation of a stipulation which excluded the petitioner's son from residing in or
visiting her apartment, and noted that stipulations entered into for the purpose of
resolving tenancy termination proceedings, "like contracts generally, should not
be set aside or modified absent a showing of fraud, collusion, mistake or the
like." Id. at 19, 21.
5' 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
14 Id. at 187.
" 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The issue in Fuentes was the constitutionality of a
replevin statute authorizing contractual provisions in installment contracts which
allowed sellers to repossess property if the buyer defaulted on the payments.
Plaintiff Fuentes signed sales contracts which provided in small print and
without explanation of the meaning of the term, "in the event of default of any
payment or payments, Seller at its option may take back the merchandise." The
Court reasoned that the language of the contract was merely a statement entitling
the seller to repossess the goods upon the happening of a default; on its face, the
language did not waive plaintiffs constitutional right to a pre-seizure hearing.
Ultimately, the Court held that the statute's prejudgment replevin provisions
"work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny
the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their
possessor." Id. at 94-96.
11
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whom the waiver is enforceable did not bargain for it.56
Additionally, if the contractual language of waiver of due process
rights is not clear on its face, courts need not address whether the
party agreed to the waiver intelligently or voluntarily."
Accordingly, the Robinson court found that replacing the
procedural "safeguards provided by the Escalera decision, the
consent decrees and the Procedures" through use of form
stipulations to resolve tenancy termination proceedings "increases
the serious risk of unknowing or involuntary waiver.""8  The
stipulation signed by Robinson was not, on its face, a clear waiver,
of constitutional rights.59 Rather, the language in the stipulation
was "opaque legalese"; the meaning and significance of what
Robinson waived by agreeing to the stipulation was unclear.'
Thus, as a matter of law, the stipulation used to resolve the prior
termination hearing was not an informed, knowing and voluntary
waiver of Robinson's constitutionally protected federal rights.6
Consequently, in the public housing context, use of form
stipulations to resolve tenancy termination proceedings will require
56 Id. at 95.
57 Id.
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EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
United States Constitution Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
New York Constitution Article I, Section 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the parly accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel....
15
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